This paper presents a fault tolerant configuration for a multiple discrete control system. The distributed control nodes, such as programmable logic controllers, communicate over networks. The design methodology of an additional redundant controller using Galois field and an error-detecting code is proposed. The proposed method is implemented and tested on distributed controllers connected on a network. It is shown that the system is functional even if one of the controllers fails. From a reliability analysis, it is also shown that the proposed design method drastically improves the mean time to failure of the discrete control system.
I. Introduction
Discrete controls with programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are widely used for manufacturing automation and process control. Recently years, the efficiency of production systems has improved. It is required to reduce stocks on the manufacturing lines as much as possible. Faults of machinery and stops of lines in the production systems will bring heavy losses. In this paper, a novel method of fault tolerant configuration of discrete controllers is presented. The proposed system can continue operations even if one of any controllers fails. Unlike fully redundant control systems, the proposed system requires minimal additional cost and increases their reliability.
In the field of feedback control engineering, there are two types of strategies for fault tolerant control. One is based on a design of a controller that simultaneously stabilizes both the non-faulty and faulty plants [2] [9] . Another is based on fault detection and controller reconfiguration [6] [7] . These conventional control systems are robust against a pre-defined set of faults. On the other hand, the major concern in this paper is a fault of one of a set of distributed discrete controllers.
Section II gives a basic model of the controllers using Galois field. Next, a self-identifying failure recovery approach using parity code is derived in Section III. Section IV analyzes the reliability of the proposed system. Finally, in Section V, fault tolerance is demonstrated using experimental results for an illustrative example of a material handling system.
II. Modeling of Controllers
Consider N non-homogeneous controllers shown in Fig. 1 which are independently designed to realize each specified function. Each controller has its own remote input/output interface. Assume that all of the controllers and the remote I/Os are connected over a communication network. Suppose that the ith controller is represented by a Ladder Diagram. The Ladder Diagram can be transformed into the form [8] 
where x i is a n i -dimensional state vector whose elements are in {0, 1}, u i is a m i -dimensional input vector with elements in {0, 1}, and y i is a p i -dimensional output vector with elements in {0, 1}. The functions f Bi , h Bi consist of Boolean operation i. e., logical sums ∨, logical products ∧, and negation¯.
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The function f Bi in Boolean algebra is transformed into a function f i in Galois field as follows. GF (2) represents the Galois field with two elements in {0, 1}. Four arithmetic operations are defined in the Galois field [3] [4] . For any two variables {a, b} in the Boolean function f Bi (·), consider the transformations
These are also applied to the function h Bi (·). These transformations yield an equivalent representation of the discrete systems on Galois field
where f i and h i are polynomial functions such that
The arithmetic in Galois field is wider than that in Boolean algebra. Table I shows the arithmetic in Galois field and in Boolean algebra.
Also the representations (4)(5) over Galois field can be inversely transformed into Boolean systems
Generally, the state space becomes a metric space if a Galois field is introduced. The metric space is needed to express a dynamic transition of a discrete state because a fluctuation of a transition is based on a concept of a distance.
Conventionally, a concept of a distance was not considered in an analysis of discrete systems because it uses a Boolean algebra. Boolean algebra is applicable not to a dynamic transition analysis but to a kinematic structure analysis.
III. Self-identifying Failure Recovery

A. Design of A Redundant Controller
In this section, a recovery method from a self-identifying failure based on a simple parity code is proposed. One redundant controller PLC N +1 is added as shown in Fig. 2 to improve reliability of the whole control system against a fault of controllers. The basic idea is based on a parity code. One redundant controller that dynamically generates parity output at any moment ∀t ≥ 0 can be designed as follows:
where
n N+1 is an extended state variable which has copies of states of all sub-modules, where
m N+1 is an extended input variable which includes inputs of all sub modules, where The function f N +1 consists of copies of the dynamics of all sub-modules, i. e.
Theorem 1: When there is no failure, the output y N +1 of the controller (7)(8) satisfies the parity condition for ∀t ≥ 0
Proof: From equations (5) and (9), we compute
Note that the Galois field operation + is equivalent to Exclusive OR. Hence the sum of two equal functions is zero.
B. Failure Recovery
If ith controller fails at time t ≥ t 1 , the possible outputs
p i is noise. Assume that the failure is detectable for all other non-faulty controllers and the remote I/Os. Let the failure flag for the ith controller be θ i (t). We define θ i (t) = 1 if the ith controller fails.
Theorem 2: The estimated output of the ith controllerŷ i (t) including both the failure case θ i (t) = 1 and the non-failure case θ i (t) = 0 is given bŷ
Proof: If there is no failure of the ith controller, the estimated outputŷ i (t) = y i (t) because θ i (t) = 0. In a failure case θ i (t) = 1, from (8)
whereȳ i (t) is the desired output of the ith controller.
The O(N) of calculation (12) must be implemented in intelligent remote I/O interfaces.
IV. Reliability Analysis Assume that failure rate of each controller is constant and all controllers have same failure rate. Then the failure probability density function is p(t) = λe −λt where λ is failure rate. The probability distribution function
−λt which represents the proportion that survive to time t.
The reliability analysis described in this section is based on a three-state Markov process model [1] [5] as shown in Fig. 3 . In this figure, S 0 represents a state that all controllers are functional. S 1 is a state that one controller is down and others are functional. Due to the redundancy, the whole system is still functional even if only one controller fails. S 2 is a state that more than two controllers are down, which means the whole system fails.
The diagram is derived from the fact that the transition probability from S 0 to S 1 is (N + 1)λδt for short period δt. The failure rate for one controller out of N + 1 controllers is N + 1 times larger than that for one controller. The transition probability from S 1 to S 2 is also Nλδt. Then the transition probability from S 1 to S 0 is μδt where μ is repair rate for one controller.
Let the probability of each state S i be P i (t) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2. Then δt → 0 yields a differential equation:
From the fact that the solution of the linear differential equation
the solution of (14) with the initial condition P (0) = [1, 0, 0] T is given by
where θ = λ 2 + 2(2N + 1)λμ + μ 2 . Because both S 0 and S 1 are functional states and only the state S 2 indicates a failure, the reliability function R all (t) for whole system is obtained as
Also probability density function for system fault is obtained p all (t) = dP 2 (t)/dt. The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF all ) for whole system is calculated by
where MTBF represents the Mean Time Between Failure of each controller which corresponds to MTBF = 1/λ. And MTTR represents the Mean Time To Repair of each controller which corresponds to MTTR = 1/μ. The reliability of the control system will be drastically improved because usually the failure time is extremely longer than the repair time, i. e., MTBF MTTR.
Comparison to Conventional Configurations
In the case of a conventional configuration without redundancy, the MTTF of the whole system becomes MTTF no = MT BF/N which is obviously shorter than that for the proposed configuration. On the other hand, the reliability function of the conventional full duplex system as shown in Fig. 4 is given by
The mean time to failure of the full duplex system is obtained by 5 shows the numerical comparison of these configurations at the condition MTBF = 10, 000 hours and MTTR = 24 hours. The numbers of total controllers are N + 1 for the proposed system, 2N for the full duplex system, and N for the non-redundant system. Although MTTF of the proposed system is shorter than that of full duplex system, the proposed system requires only one redundant controller. With minimal additional cost, the proposed method still improves the reliability drastically in comparison with the conventional non-redundant system. The proposed system is most efficient from the viewpoint of gain in reliability per additional unit as shown in Fig. 6 .
V. An Illustrative Example A. Controller Design Fig. 7 shows a simplified illustrative example of a material handling robot and a press machine. When independently designed controllers are given, we can design parity controller as follows to improve the reliability against a fault of any controllers.
Assume that two controllers for the material handling robot and the press machine are given by Fig.  8 and Fig. 9 , respectively. By these controllers, the robot carries an object to the workspace of the press machine, then the machine presses it.
The control logic for the robot is designed as
where 
Then, the control logic for the press machine is 
Using (7)- (9), the additional controller is designed as follows. 
Finally we have control logic by inverse transformation (6) 
B. Experiments
Five personal computers connected by Fast Ethernet are used to emulate three PLCs and two plants. A time critical token passing mechanism is introduced to identify a faulty controller and it is implemented over UDP/IP. Table II shows the states of the controllers and plants.
In the repair process of the controller, the internal state values of other controllers were communicated and the state of the controller was reconstructed.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, an improvement of reliability of PLC based discrete systems is discussed. A fault tolerant configuration for distributed discrete controllers with one redundant controller is proposed. In combination with independently designed controllers, the additional controller is designed so as to satisfy an output parity condition. From the experiments, it is shown that the system is functional even if one of any controllers is down. According to the redundancy, the mean time to failure of the whole system is drastically improved with least additional cost. 
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